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Wednesday, 15 October 2008 10:52

“Quia nolunt dimittere credere pro credere, sed credere per intelligere”:

Ramon Llull and his Jewish Contemporaries *


Harvey Hames

History Dept

Ben Gurion University


International Conference on Inter-religious Dialogue in Ramon Llull,  15/09/2001, Instituto de Estudos Avançados, Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil.


In a number of places in his large corpus, Ramon Llull tells the story about what happened to a certain Dominican friar when on a conversion mission. The friar goes to Tunis where he debates with Sultan al-Mustansir.[1] This very capable friar was able to prove to the Sultan the falsehood of Islam; however, he was unable to prove the tenets of the Christian faith, saying 'the faith of the Christians cannot be proven'. The friar handed the Sultan a list of Christian doctrines in Arabic telling him that he should read and believe them. The Sultan was very annoyed with the friar because he had destroyed his belief in the precepts of Islam without providing him with an alternative. As a result the Sultan expelled the friar and his companions. Llull continues: 'I myself saw this friar and his colleagues. Later on this friar learned to speak Hebrew and, among others, used to dispute rather frequently in Barcelona with a certain Jew, very learned in Hebrew and a Rabbi. This Jew told me on many occasions that if he [i.e. Martí] could definitively demonstrate by reason the truth of the faith in which he believed [i.e. Christianity], then he [the Rabbi] would become a Christian'.[2] It has been suggested that the friar was the renowned Ramon Martí, author of the monumental polemical tract Pugio fidei. The Jewish Rabbi in the account had been previously identified with Nahmanides; however if the said friar is Ramón Martí, then the Jewish disputant must be Solomon ibn Adret, Nahmanides’ disciple and leader of the community in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.[3]

In a small work written in 1309 which discussed the conformity or harmony that should exist between faith and reason, Llull wrote that ‘one should not be willing to renounce one belief for another, but (to renounce) a belief for the sake of understanding’, in other words, one should abandon one’s faith only if totally convinced of the truth of the other faith.[4] In another work in which Faith disputes Intellect written in Montpellier in 1303, Intellect persuades Faith of the importance of being able to prove via necessary reason the truth of the Christian faith.[5] For Llull, if one wanted to persuade a Jew or Muslim to convert to Christianity, it would not be enough to ridicule that persons faith and show it to be utterly false, but one would have to be able to definitely prove to the satisfaction of one’s opponent, the truth of Christianity. Interestingly enough, Llull’s sentiments are echoed in a Jewish rebuttal of Christian argumentation composed by the aforementioned Solomon ibn Adret. He wrote:


...and someone seeking to separate and convert someone from his faith to another faith with which he [the one converting] is unfamiliar, will need, in any case, to present many strong arguments and much investigation till he can overcome [beliefs] to which he is accustomed through his own investigation. He should be taught these [arguments] and he should study and interiorise them in his heart [the soul] many times over and test them faithfully as to whether they are the truth, and that they are not refutable. For without this, it would be lacking in integrity for a person to exchange his God through weak arguments, and not even strong arguments should [bring] him [to convert] until he has investigated them, and finds that there is no more room for doubt.[6]

For ibn Adret, the idea that someone should be forced to convert, or that someone would convert without having fully investigated the other faith and come to the irrefutable conclusion that the other faith was true, was abhorrent. While for Llull, conversion of the unbelievers was something to be desired and worked towards, and for ibn Adret, something to be fought against, both agreed that if someone decided to convert, it should be out of complete conviction, and not coercion.

The incident in Tunis, followed up by the discussions in Barcelona between Marti, the Rabbi, ibn Adret and Llull sums up the different approaches to the issue of religious conversion in the late thirteenth-century. Martí was a product of the university world and adopted scholastic methodology for conversion, whereby Llull was an autodidactic maverick, who developed his own unique approach to this issue. For Martí, while the doctrines of other faiths could be disproved the Christian doctrines were unprovable by reason, but must be believed, while for Llull, it was possible, indeed necessary to prove the tenets of Christianity. If Ibn Adret was able to hold Martí at bay because he could not‘definitively demonstrate by reason the truth of the faith in which he believed’, he would be unable to do the same with Llull.

However, in order to understand the contrast between Martí and Llull, it is necessary to first give a brief overview of intellectual developments within the Jewish world and illuminate some of the many points of contact with Christianity. As the renaissance of the twelfth century had done for the Christian world, the transmission of knowledge into Western Europe raised important issues within the Jewish community as well.[7] The increased study of Aristotle combined with the towering presence of Maimonides (d. 1204), meant that Rabbis and intellectuals were trying to rationalise their faith, re-examining central existential questions such as the relationship between the Creator and creation, God and man, and the reasoning behind the performance of the commandments.[8] While the growing influence of the works of Maimonides contributed to this, it was the more radical Aristotelianism, mainly in the form of Averroism, which Maimonides himself rejected, which was to cause the most consternation as the century progressed. The Rabbis in southern Europe, like their Christian contemporaries in the north, were re-discovering nature and the self, and this caused them to read and interpret the Torah and its precepts in new and provocative ways.[9]

These developments caused a “conservative” backlash, which was, in reality, radical and innovative. Concerned by what they saw as a distancing between man and God, and a philosophical position which undermined the daily concerns and practices of many Jews, some of the exponents of an esoteric mystical Judaism whose roots are unclear, saw its potential in redressing the balance, and restoring the vitality of Judaism.[10] The exponents of these mystical teachings, known as Kabbalah, held that their theosophical teachings were not innovations, but that they were revealing ancient teachings that had been passed orally from master to disciple. The Kabbalists’ claim was conservative, in that everything had been revealed to Moses at Sinai, and had been transmitted from generation to generation. They were just imparting theosophical teachings that had been hidden for generations, but which were part of the long chain of transmission going back to the divine theophany.[11] The esoteric and mystical implications of these teachings, especially those dealing with the sefirot, came to be seen as important for redressing the issues of the immanent relationship between man and God, creation, and the importance of performing the commandments.

Thus, the emergence of Kabbalah in the thirteenth-century was a reaction, not only to the increased danger of apostasy, but as a viable alternative to explain and imbue Jewish life with new vitality and content. The Kabbalistic movement was not just an esoteric doctrine restricted to an elite, but an alternative religious system that sought to engage with the wider community providing the Jewish teachings with new content. The - erroneously named - Maimonidean controversy of the thirteenth century was really the struggle of conservatism against more modernist tendencies, or the struggle of the traditionalist Kabbalists against both mainstream and radical philosophising. It was a conflict between a new and essentially rational approach to Judaism, and the needs of a community in exile, requiring a more tangible and immanent Deity with whom to share the harshness of daily reality. However, while Kabbalah presented itself as a reinterpretation rather than an innovation, the very introduction at this moment in time of such a theosophy into mainstream Judaism was innovative. The transference of these teachings from the private domain of a very small and select elite into the public domain, and the interpretation given them in light of social circumstances was a radical step which was not taken lightly, and was not without opposition from within. Similar to developments in Christian thought during this century, there were those who were prepared to apply the newly discovered philosophical methods to claims of religious truth in order to clarify them in light of contemporary knowledge, while others attempted to resist this trend as both dangerous and unnecessary in light of a revealed truth which was self contained.[12] Thus, the thirteenth century was primarily an attempt to find the right balance between two supposedly opposing ideologies, one innovative and forward looking, the other traditional and conservative in appearance, however, in reality, the latter was just as innovative and radical as the former.[13]

Yet a Judaism which was examining itself anew from within, was also facing serious challenges from without. The toleration and acceptance of the Jewish presence in Christian society, which for many centuries had been determined, in the main, by St Augustine’s teaching of the Jews as a testimonium veritatis, was undergoing serious review. Jeremy Cohen has suggested that the attitude towards the Jews changed during the twelfth century because they lost their uniqueness as the only “other” within Christian society.[14] The need to deal rationally with the Muslims also changed the status of the Jews, as their post-biblical texts, as did the Islamic texts, came under the microscope. It was the broadening of Christian horizons coupled with “new” texts and ways of thinking about the world and their own place in it, which made Christians more critical of those who were not intra ecclesia.[15] In addition, the challenges of philosophical reasoning to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity set scholars to examining Jewish post-biblical texts in order to discover within them support for the truth of Christianity. Hence, the polemical writings should not be analysed as a separate or unique phenomenon, but must be seen as an integrated part of what was going on in Christian intellectual circles in this period.[16] As such, they are a reflection of Christian self-doubt and the need to substantiate religious truth under siege from other quarters, by showing that the Jewish texts affirm Christianity, and by achieving Jewish conversion, giving confirmation of the true faith.

It is, therefore, not surprising that although instigated in Rome, the opening salvo in this concerted effort to convert the Jews was fired in Paris in 1240, where the Talmud was put on trail, subjected to close scrutiny, declared blasphemous, and even burned. A long list of errors and blasphemies contained the Talmud was compiled by Eudes de Chateauroux, much in the same manner as philosophical errors would also be condemned. For the theologians of Paris, anything which could undermine the truth of Christianity was suspect and needed to be purged, thus, if the Talmud was blasphemous, it could cause injury to the faith, and it prevented Jews from realising the truth.[17] The path leading from Paris to Barcelona in 1263 and from there to Ramon Marti’s Pugio fidei is a direct one, though the Christian theologians realised that aside from the blasphemies, there was plenty in Rabbinic literature which indicated that the Jewish sages had realised the truth of Christianity. The famous disputation in 1263 between the Jewish apostate turned Dominican, Friar Paul, and the undisputed leader of the Jewish community in Spain, Nahmanides, is a good example of the application of scholastic methodology to conversion work, the close reading of post-biblical literature, as well as an expression of Christian self doubt allayed by proofs found in the Jewish texts.

Ramon Marti’s Pugio fidei is the most potent example of this new and intense Christian approach to Jewish texts, both for confirming Christian truths and for achieving conversion. The methodology used is that of a scholastic commentary, implying a close and very careful analysis of the texts pertaining to the specific problem in order to arrive at a measured and reasoned conclusion. In the second part of the Pugio, Martí seeks support from the Jewish sources that the Messiah has already come, and in the third part he deals with the Trinity. Here, Martí wished to prove that there is a Trinity, and to elaborate the process of salvation from the creation of man and original sin, till redemption through the incarnation of Christ. The method used is a careful reading and translation of the relevant texts, the use of Jewish medieval commentators such as Rashi and Rabbi David Kimhi (Radak) as authorities on the literal meaning, and showing how the chosen texts illustrate the principle being discussed.

The increased pressure on the Jews in Spain is also evident from the many requests by the mendicant orders for licenses to preach to the infidel. Pope Innocent IV in a letter of 1245, which includes part of an earlier missive of the Catalan-Aragonese count-king, James I, concludes: ‘In addition, we wish and decree that, whenever the archbishops, bishops, or Dominicans and Franciscans arrive at a town or place where Muslims or Jews are to be found, and they wish to preach the word of God to those Jews or Muslims, they must gather at their invitation, and patiently listen to their preaching, and if they do not want to come of their own free wills, putting all excuses aside, our officials should compel them to attend’.[18] James I had already given permission for this type of preaching in 1243 in which he himself participated in the aftermath of the Barcelona disputation. The Dominicans in particular were very active in this endeavor, and while at first the Jews had to go to the Church to hear their preaching, because of ensuing violence, these activities were moved to the Jewish quarter (call) and the number of people allowed to accompany the mendicants was limited.[19] In addition, religious polemic was carried out even by laymen as is exemplified by the Majorca disputation of 1268, which involved a Genoese merchant and one of the local Jewish scholars.[20]

Thus, the Jewish community, while attempting to sort out its internal disagreements discussed above, also had to come to terms with the increased Christian polemical activity, which it could ill afford to ignore. The intense application of reason to faith and the increased openness to new ideas, meant that apostasy was a real danger which had to be combated. Here, it is possible to see how intellectual currents cross religious boundaries and effect and change cultural sensibilities. Milhamot ha-Shem, a late twelfth-century Jewish reply to Christian claims written by Jacob ben Reuven reflects the utmost confidence in the Christian world in reason as the ancilla theologia. In the first chapter, Rueven’s Christian adversary says: ‘and I will bring you proofs from the creation so that through them you will come to understand the greatness of the Creator…’, and he proceeds to prove the articles of faith using reason.[21] Jacob answers with his own philosophical argumentation in order to undermine the Christian claims. The other chapters of the work return to the age-old pattern of searching the authoritative sources, in this case only the Bible, for proofs of the truth of Christianity. In the last couple of chapters, Jacob takes the Christian’s method and applies it himself to the Gospel of Matthew.

The Jewish responses in the thirteenth century reflect the winds of change in the Christian camp wherein the limitations of philosophical reasoning for theological matters was continually being exposed and challenged. The Jewish polemical works concentrate on rebutting the Christian interpretations of biblical and rabbinic texts. In other words, what occurs is a scholastic exchange over the meaning of Jewish authoritative texts which seem to imply Christian truths, rather than attempts to definitively prove the articles of faith. In this regard, one can cite Nahmanides’ Vikuah, which is his literary reworking of the Barcelona disputation.[22] Another good example is the Nizzahon Vetus written at the end of the thirteenth century, which peruses the Jewish sources commonly used by Christian polemicists and refutes their claims. The author also extensively cites from the New Testament in order to ridicule Christian beliefs.[23] The aforementioned Solomon ibn Adret wrote his long and detailed refutations of Ramon Martí’s claims along the same lines.[24] The Jewish polemicists did not need to engage with their own belief systems because their Christian interlocutors were only interested in what the texts revealed about Christianity. As long as they could provide reasonable and alternative readings, their Jewish identities and beliefs were not in too much danger of being compromised.

Given common intellectual interests, it is not surprising that the ongoing controversies within the Jewish camp between the Kabbalists and the rationalists were also intimately connected with Jewish-Christian polemic. For example, Meir ben Simon of Narbonne in his polemical work Milhemet Mitzvah which incorporates discussions that he had with the Bishop and other dignitaries, also writes against the Kabbalists. He claims that he is writing ‘'to contradict those who speak evil about God, and about the wise men who walk in the path of the pure Torah and who are God fearing. And they [the Kabbalists] consider themselves wise and they invent things and come close to heresy, and think to bring proof for their teachings from the Aggadot which they interpret incorrectly'.[25] Both Kabbalists and Christians are using Aggadot – Midrash to further their own purposes, and both are just as dangerous for Jews. David Kimhi who was a supporter of the study of philosophy, wrote a response to Christianity, and was also active in trying to combat the spread of Kabbalah. Even within the ranks of the Kabbalists there was dissent and controversy which comes to the fore in the comment made by the ecstatic Kabbalist, Abraham Abulafia, who disliking the theosophical sefirotic teachings of his colleagues said: ‘and thus I will tell you that the sefirotic Kabbalists thinking to unify the Name [of God] and to flee from all ideas of trinity have made God into ten, and as the Christians say that it is three and the three are one, hence some of the Kabbalists believe and say that the Godhead is ten sefirot and the ten are one'.[26]

[1] See E. Longpre, 'Le B. Raymund Lulle et Raymond Marti O.P.', Bolletti de la Societat Arqueologica Luliana 44, (1933) p. 270 reprinted in Estudios Lulianos 13, (1969) p. 199. See also J.M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, (Cambridge 19752) pp. 140-43.

[2] See De acquisitione Terrae Sanctae, 3.1  pp. 126-27. '...Istum fratrum et suos socios ego vidi. Ulterius sciebat loqui hebraico iste frater et inter alios. cum quodam Judaeo, valde hebraico litterato et magistro, Barcinonae frequentius disputabat; qui Judaeus aliquoties mihi dixit quod, si in fide sua promittebat se intelligere quod credebat, ipse se faceret christianum’.

[3] See E. Longpre, 'Le B. Raymund Lulle et Raymond Marti O.P.',  pp. 198-200 who identifies the friar as Ramón Marti and suggests 1268-69 as a possible timeframe; S.W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, (New York and Philadelphia 19832) vol. 9, p. 281 and J. Cohen, 'The Christian Adversary of Solomon ibn Adret', Jewish Quarterly Review 71, (1980-81) pp. 51-5. See also A. Bonner, L 'Apologetica de Ramon Martí i Ramon Llull davant de l'Islam i del Judaisme', El Debat intercultural als segles 13 i 14. Actes de les Jornades de Filosofia Catalana, Girona 25-7 d' Abril de 1988, (Girona 1989), pp. 179-80.

[4] Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in obiecto, in Raymundi Lulli Opera omnia, [henceforth MOG] (ed.) I. Salzinger, 8 vols, (Mainz 1721-42), vol. 4, xii, p. 2: 'quia nolunt dimittere credere pro credere, sed credere pro intelligere'. 

[5] Disputatio fidei et intellectus, MOG 4, viii, pp. 2-7. The aforementioned story about the missionary (probably Ramon Martí) who manages to convince a Muslim ruler of the errors in Islam but is unable to prove the Christian truths and thus earns the scorn of the ruler who feels that he has lost everything and gained nothing, is told here by Intellect.

[6] Teshubot ha-Rashba (The Responsa of Solomon ibn Adret), (ed.) C. Dimitrovski, 2 vols, (Jerusalem 1990), vol. 1, p. 215. It is interesting to note that in his Commentary on the Legends in the Talmud, (ed.) L.A. Feldman, (Jerusalem 1991) p. 103 ibn Adret seems to infer the opposite saying, 'Anything received or accepted via prophecy will not be contradicted by reason, because reason is inferior to prophecy', and on p. 105 he says, that 'received lore even if philosophical reasoning shows it to be wrong, should not be abandoned'.

[7] C. H. Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, (Cambridge, Mass. 1927); R.L. Benson and G. Constable (eds), Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, (Cambridge, Mass. 1979) and G. Constable, The Reformation of the Twelfth Century, (Cambridge 1996). See also I.G. Marcus, ‘The Dynamics of Jewish Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century’, in M.A. Signer and J. Van Engen (eds), Jews and Christians in Twelfth-Century Europe, (Notre Dame 2001) 27-45.

[8] A valuable general survey of Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages, see C. Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages, (Cambridge 1985)

[9] See among others M.-D. Chenu, Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century: Essays on New Theological Perspectives in the Latin West, (Chicago 1968).

[10] On the essence of Kabbalah, see G. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, (New York 1961) and his Origins of the Kabbalah (Princeton 1987). See also M. Idel, Kabbalah: New Perspectives, (New Haven and London 1988) and E. Wolfson, Through a  Speculum that Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval Jewish Mysticism, (Princeton 1995).

[11] See for example Nahmanides, Commentary on the Torah, (ed.) C.D. Chavel, (Jerusalem 1959-60) vol. 1, p. 9, '...[and this matter] will not be known in its entirety but from the received tradition (ha-kabbalah) back to Moses from the mouth of the Almighty...' or 'One cannot achieve knowledge of the full truth of these matters and others like them but from received tradition (kabbalah) ... and that is receiving from someone who has received (mekabel mi-pi mekabel) all the way back to Moses from the mouth of the Almighty'. Nahmanides, The Writings of Nahmanides, (ed.) C.D. Chavel, (Jerusalem 1963-64) vol. 1, p. 190. See also p. 170 where he talks about the Rabbis of the Talmud as possessing 'all the received tradition' (mekubalim ba-kol). For Nahmanides as for other Kabbalists in the thirteenth century, the use of the term 'Kabbalah' does not just imply the meaning given it today, but rather, as suggested here, refers to the traditional chain of transmission from Moses till the present day, and implies the mystical meaning as well. For some examples of this, see E. Wolfson, 'By Way of Truth: Aspects of Nahmanides' Kabbalistic Hermeneutic', AJS Review 14, (1989) p. 163.

[12] From Bernard of Clairvaux who opposed scholars like Abelard all the way to St.Bonaventura and Peter John Olivi who opposed radical philosophy as tearing the Church apart from within.

[13] That the Kabbalists themselves were aware of innovation becomes clear in their claim that early Kabbalists such as Abraham ben David and Isaac the Blind received giluy Eliyahu - the appearance of Elijah, who revealed hidden teachings to them. The need to justify the teachings in terms of revelation surely indicates an awareness of potential opposition to some of these teachings. See my 'Elijah and a Shepherd: The Authority of Revelation', Studia Lulliana 34, (1994) pp. 93-102.

[14] His analysis fits in well with what has been written by other regarding significant changes that where occuring in the twelfth century, which made the Augustinian understanding of the position of Jews in Christian society untenable for many. See R.I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe 950-1250, (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass. 1987); A. Funkenstein, ‘Changes in the Patterns of Christian Anti-Jewish Polemics in the 12th Century’ (Hebrew), Zion 33-4 (1968-9), pp. 125-44,  'Basic types of Christian anti-Jewish polemics in the later Middle Ages', Viator 2, (1971) pp. 374-381 and his ‘Changes in the Patterns of Anti-Jewish Polemics in the Twelfth Century’, in B. Lewis and F. Niewöhner (eds), Religiongespräche im Mittelalter, (Wiesbaden 1992) pp. 93-114; A. Sapir Abulafia, Christians and Jews in the Twelfth-Century Renaissance, London and New York 1995.

[15] See Cohen, Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity, (Berkeley 1999) pp. 147-66 and his 'Scholarship and Intolerance in the Medieval Academy: The Study and Evaluation of Judaism in European Christendom', American Historical Review 91, (1986) pp. 592-613.

[16] For a similar remark, see G.G. Stroumsa, ‘Anti-Cathar Polemics and the Liber de Duobus Principiis’, in Lewis (ed.), Religiongespräche im Mittelalter, pp. 176-77

[17] See J. Cohen, The Friars and the Jews, (Ithaca and London 1982) pp. 51-76. See also R. Chazan, Daggers of Faith: Thirteenth-Century Christian Missionizing and Jewish Response, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1989) and for some of the texts which describe the events in Paris, H. Maccoby, Judaism on Trial: Jewish-Christian Disputations in the Middle Ages, (London 1993) pp. 153-67

[18] See S. Simonsohn, The Apostolic See and the Jews – Documents: 492-1404, (Toronto 1988) p. 184

[19] For the statute of 1243, see Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Aragón y de Valencia y Principado de Cataluña, vol. 1, (Madrid 1896) pp. 217-18. On this issue, see J. Riera i Sans, 'Les llicències reials per a predicar a jueus i sarraïns (segles XIII - XIV)', Calls 2, (1987) pp. 113-19. See J. Régné, History of the Jews in Aragon,  p. 69, n. 386 (25/10/1268).  See also p. 131 n. 723 (19/4/1279). In 1263, the King had already indicated that the Jews did not have to leave the confines of the call to hear the preaching. See J. Régné, History of the Jews in Aragon: Regesta and Documents 1213-1327, (ed.) Y. Assis, (Jerusalem 1978), p. 42 n. 217 (30/8/1263). See also J. Riera i Sans, 'Les llicèncias reials', pp. 117-18. Peter III legislated on this issue a number of times confining the number of people allowed to accompany the friars to between fourteen and eighteen and eventually to just four. See Régné, History of the Jews, nums 386 (25/10/1268), 735 (21/6/1279), 746 (8/10/1279).

[20] See O. Limor, The Disputation of Majorca 1286: A critical edition and introduction, 2 vols, (PhD. Dissertation, Hebrew University) Jerusalem 1984 [revised and published as Die Disputationen zu Ceuta (1179) und Mallorca (1286): Zwei antijüdische Schriften aus dem mittelalterichen Genua, (Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, vol. 15) Munich 1994]

[21] Jacob ben Reuven, Milhamot ha-Shem (Wars of the Lord), (ed.) Y. Rosenthal, (Jerusalem 1963) p. 8

[22] Nahmanides, The Writings of Nahmanides, vol. 1, pp. 302-20 and an English translation in Maccoby, Judaism on Trial, pp. 102-46

[23] See D. Berger, The Jewish-Christian Debate in the High Middle Ages: A Critical Edition of the Nizzahon Vetus, (Philadelphia 1979)

[24] See Dimitrovsky, Teshubot ha-Rashba, vol. 1, pp. 159-221

[25] G. Scholem, 'A New Document for the History of the Origins of the Kabbalah' (Hebrew), in J. Fichman (ed.), Sefer Bialik, (Tel Aviv 1934) p. 146.

[26] See Ve-zot li-Yehudah, in A. Jellinek, Auswahl kabbalistischer Mystik, (Leipzig 1853) p. 19


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